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We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by extending an insight by Le Treust and Tomala to the case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. Namely, that an information design problem subject to constraints can be represented as an unconstrained information design problem with additional states, one for each constraint. Thus, without loss of generality, optimal solutions induce as many posteriors as the number of states and constraints. We provide results that refine this upper bound. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which there is no duality gap in constrained information design, thus validating a Lagrangian approach. We illustrate our results with applications to mechanism design with limited commitment and persuasion of a privately informed receiver. Funding: L. Doval acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation through [Grant SES-2131706]. V. Skreta acknowledges the support from the National Science Foundation through [Grant SES-1851729] and from the European Research Council (ERC) through consolidator [Grant 682417]. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1346 . 

We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism‐selection games in which the designer can only commit to short‐term mechanisms. We identify acanonicalclass of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of any equilibrium in a mechanism‐selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. Our result simplifies the search for the designer‐optimal outcome by reducing the agent's behavior to a series of participation, truth telling, and Bayes' plausibility constraints the mechanisms must satisfy.